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Non-Technical Summary 
 
The central instrument of Europe’s current climate policy is the EU Emissions Trading 
Scheme (EU ETS) which was established in 2005 and enters its second trading period in 
2008. The free allowance allocation in the EU ETS has recently been criticized for its 
generous and differential treatment of regulated industries. Against this background, this 
paper analyzes the process of allowance allocation in the EU ETS on political-economy 
grounds. A theoretical framework suggests that the preferences of sectoral interest groups are 
considered by the government when allocating emissions permits. Therefore, industries 
represented by more powerful lobby groups face a lower regulatory burden, which for 
sufficiently high lobbying power leads to an inefficient emissions regulation. An empirical 
analysis of the first trading phase of the EU ETS corroborates our theoretical prediction for a 
cross-section of German firms, but also shows that the political-economy determinants of 
permit allocation depend on characteristics of the regulated firms. We find that large carbon 
emitters that were heavily exposed to emissions regulation and simultaneously represented by 
powerful interest groups received higher levels of emissions allowances. In contrast, industrial 
lobbying power stand-alone or threats of potential worker layoffs did not exert a significant 
influence on the EU ETS allocation process.  
 
 
Das Wichtigste in Kürze 
 
In diesem Papier untersuchen wir den Allokationsprozess für Verschmutzungsrechte im 
europäischen Emissionshandelssystem (EU ETS). Im theoretischen Modell werden 
Industrien, die von stärkeren Interessengruppen repräsentiert werden, im Vergleich zu 
anderen Sektoren weniger strikt reguliert. Daher kann der Einfluss von Interessengruppen auf 
die Allokationsentscheidung der Regierung zu einer ineffizienten Ausgestaltung von 
Umweltregulierung führen. Eine empirische Analyse der ersten Handelsperiode des EU ETS 
untermauert die Aussagen des theoretischen Modells. Die ökonometrische Untersuchung für 
Deutschland zeigt zudem, dass die politökonomischen Determinanten der Allokation von 
Emissionsrechten durch Charakteristika der regulierten Unternehmen bestimmt werden. 
Große Emittenten, die sowohl der Regulierung durch das EU ETS stark ausgesetzt als auch 
von einflussreichen Interessengruppen vertreten sind, profitieren demnach von einer 
vergleichsweise großzügigen Zuteilung mit Verschmutzungsrechten. 
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1 Introduction 
The central instrument of Europe’s current climate policy is the EU Emissions Trading 
Scheme (EU ETS) which was established in 2005 and enters its second trading period in 2008 
(EU, 2003). Aiming at emissions reductions at least cost, the EU ETS was celebrated as a 
“new grand policy experiment” already before its implementation (Kruger and Pizer, 2004). 
However, the actual implementation of the EU ETS suggests that due to a generous allowance 
allocation to covered industries, the induced emissions abatement is rather limited. This paper 
investigates whether the permit allocation design in the EU ETS is representing public interest 
in terms of economic efficiency or can be explained by the presence of sectoral interest 
groups. 
The outspoken objective of the EU ETS is to achieve Europe’s greenhouse gas emissions 
reduction commitments under the Kyoto Protocol at minimal cost through the tradability of 
emissions rights (or likewise abatement efforts) across major emissions sources. The EU ETS 
covers more than 10,000 energy-intensive installations that belong to mainly five industrial 
sectors: power, heat and steam generation; oil refineries; iron and steel production; mineral 
industries (e.g. cement, lime and glass); pulp and paper plants (EU 2003). Each Member State 
is obligated to set up a National Allocation Plan (NAP) where it defines the cap on emissions 
allowances for sectors (installations) included in the trading scheme and the specific 
allocation rule for grandfathering, i.e. the entitlement with free pollution rights based on 
historical emissions. 
Standard economic theory suggests that the introduction of market-based instruments of 
environmental policy – such as (uniform) emissions taxes or (auctioned) tradable emissions 
allowances – can generate cost-efficient emissions reductions by equalizing marginal 
abatement costs across polluters. However, over the last decades the implementation of 
environmental taxes in industrialized countries most commonly implied a differentiation of 
tax rates between sectors (OECD, 2007). On efficiency grounds, also the free allowance 
allocation in the EU ETS has been criticized for its generous and differential treatment of 
regulated industries, as well as its incomplete sectoral coverage. This invokes scientific 
interest in the role of lobbying for the observed allocation pattern across sectors: Can the 
power of sectoral interest groups explain the differential treatment of EU industries in the 
entitlement with free emissions permits? If lobbying for emissions allowances is effective, can 
it induce economic inefficiencies by shifting the economic burden of emissions abatement to 
those sectors excluded from emissions trading? While a number of studies on the economic 
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impacts of EU ETS regulation indicate the existence of such a burden shifting (see Böhringer 
et al., 2005; Kallbekken, 2005; or Peterson, 2006), its rationale has remained implicit to date. 
The lacking welfare-economic explanation for the observed regulatory design represents the 
initiation of our political-economy analysis of the EU ETS. Building on Olson’s (1965) theory 
of the formation and power of interest groups, positive theories have presented alternative 
approaches to study the political-economy determinants of policy outcomes (see Oates and 
Portney, 2003 for the context of environmental policy). As a prominent example, rent-seeking 
models describe how interest groups compete for group-specific rents (Tullock 1980), 
specifically in the context of environmental instrument choice (Dijkstra 1998). Moreover, 
models of information transfer describe the exchange of truthful information between interest 
groups and policy makers, upon which politicians base their decisions (Grossman and 
Helpman 2001, Naevdal and Brazee 2000, Potters and van Winden 1992). 
Previous studies on political-economy determinants of environmental taxation include 
Frederiksson (1997) and Aidt (1997, 1998) who investigate the implications of international 
competition and revenue recycling for the design of environmental tax reforms. In this 
context, Anger et al. (2006) provide a first combined theoretical and empirical analysis of the 
role of interest groups in environmental tax differentiation. They show that a sectoral 
differentiation of green tax reforms is not only determined by the activity of lobby groups 
favoring reduced environmental tax rates, but also by the groups’ interest in revenue rebates 
to labor. The existing political-economy literature on emissions regulation by tradable permits 
focuses on the choice between free permit allocation based on historic emissions levels and 
auctioning of pollution rights. Hanoteau (2005) theoretically shows that in the presence of 
interest groups an environmental regulator prefers a free allocation of permits over auctioning, 
and relaxes the underlying emissions cap. Markussen and Svendsen (2005) argue that 
dominant industrial lobby groups influenced the corresponding EU ETS directive towards a 
grandfathered allocation rule, thereby affirming Hanoteau’s (2005) findings. Analyzing data 
from the first EU ETS trading phase, also Buchner et al. (2006) mention the presence of 
industrial lobby groups in order to explain the political allocation process. Hanoteau (2003) 
empirically shows that political influence by means of financial campaign contributions 
affected the distribution of permits within the U.S. sulphur emissions trading system. 
The present paper tries to complement the political-economy analysis of the EU ETS with an 
explicit and combined theoretical and empirical assessment of the role of interest groups in 
the EU emissions trading system by providing a twofold contribution: First, we develop a 
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stylized common-agency framework for the allocation of emissions allowances in a cap and 
trade system, where the regulator values political contributions from sectoral interest groups 
when determining the stringency of allowance allocation. Second, we test the predictions of 
our analytical model with an empirical analysis on the political-economy determinants of 
permit allocation in the EU ETS for a large cross section of regulated firms in Germany. To 
our best knowledge we thereby provide the first econometric assessment of the role of interest 
groups in the EU ETS. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we develop a political-
economy framework for the allocation of emissions allowances in a cap and trade system. In 
section 3, we present our empirical analysis of the determinants of permit allocation in the EU 
ETS. In section 4, we conclude.  
 
2 Theoretical framework 
In this section we present a stylized analytical framework of the role of interest groups for the 
allocation of emissions allowances in a cap and trade system. The model is structured as a 
common-agency problem, in which principals (interest groups) aim to induce an action from 
an agent (the government). As introduced by Grossman and Helpman (1994) in the context of 
international trade, lobby groups may influence political decisions – here: the stringency of 
allowance allocation – as the government does not only care about social welfare but also 
values political contributions by interest groups. 
In order to analyze the firm’s behavior on the emissions market, we build on the one-sector 
partial equilibrium model by Böhringer and Lange (2005) assessing emissions-based 
allocation rules in cap-and-trade systems. In our model we consider an emissions-constrained 
economy with two production sectors { }netsetsi ,∈ , one of which is regulated by an 
emissions trading scheme (ets) while the other is excluded from the scheme (nets). Sectoral 
emissions ie  are the product of the emissions rate (or intensity) iμ  and the output level iq  
( i i ie qμ= ). Marginal production costs ( )⋅c  are constant in output, decreasing in emissions rate 
( ( ) 0,  '( ) 0,  ''( ) 0≥ < >c c cμ μ μ ). Inverse demand for output )(qP  is decreasing in q and 
differentiable.  
In order to fulfill a given economy-wide emissions target E  (as committed to e.g. under the 
Kyoto Protocol) the national government implements a hybrid system of emissions regulation: 
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tradable emissions allowances for the covered ets sectors and emissions taxation for the 
remaining nets sectors of the economy. Motivated by the EU Emissions Trading Scheme, 
emissions permits are freely allocated to ets sectors based on pollution levels, i.e. emissions 
rates and output levels. The stringency of emissions regulation is represented by an allocation 
factor α  that denotes the fraction of benchmark emissions freely allocated as allowances, so 
that the sectoral permit allocation equals ets etsqαμ . Emissions allowances are tradable 
internationally at an exogenous permit price σ . For nets sectors, the regulator allows the 
remaining emissions budget of ets etsE qαμ−  in order to fulfill the economy-wide target. 
The political process involves an incumbent government (i.e. an environmental regulator) and 
an industrial lobby group that represents sectoral (i.e. firms’) interests. Motivated by current 
EU emissions regulation, we assume the formation of interest groups only for the covered ets 
sector, while the nets industry does not feature lobbying activities. We base this assumption 
on the fact that the EU Emissions Trading Scheme covers mainly energy-intensive industries 
and represents the dominant instrument of environmental regulation for these sectors. In 
contrast, the remaining segments of EU economies (e.g. the transport sector or households) 
are subject to a more diverse set of environmental policy instruments (such as energy taxes or 
subsidies). Besides their single-targeted motive of lobbying for free emissions allowances, 
energy-intensive industries also feature a relatively high degree of concentration, which 
according to Olson (1965) should enable a better organization of interests by overcoming the 
problem of free-riding.  
Motivated by Grossman and Helpman (1994), in the model the lobby group can offer a set of 
political contributions ( )etsK α  to the government depending on the envisaged policy decision. 
In our context, sectoral contributions are thus a function of the allocation factor. Political 
contributions may either represent monetary campaign donations by interest groups or a more 
general form of political support, such as information transfer between interest groups and 
policy makers (Grossman and Helpman 2001). In our analysis we abstract from interest group 
formation and behavior and thus focus on the political equilibrium in which lobby 
contributions ( )etsK α  reflect the true preferences of interest groups: a marginal change in the 
lobby contribution for a marginal policy change corresponds to the effect of the policy change 
on the group’s welfare. 
Against this political-economy background, aggregate profit maximization in sector ets (firms 
are price taker on the goods and emissions market), including the costs or revenues from 
emissions trading as well as efforts for political contributions, is given as: 
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,
max ( ) (1 ) ( )
ets ets
ets ets ets ets ets ets ets ets etsq
p q c q q Kμ π μ σ α μ α= − − − − .  
Likewise, aggregate profit maximization in the nets sector which is regulated by an emissions 
tax (firms are price taker on the goods market) is given as: 
netsnetsnetsnetsnetsnetsnetsnetsq
qqcqp
netsnets
τμμπμ −−= )(max, . 
The corresponding first-order conditions of the firm can be found in Appendix A.1. Social 
welfare (gross of political contributions) is composed of aggregate consumer and producer 
surplus including the costs or revenues from emissions trading and emissions tax payments: 
0
( ) ( ) (1 )
iq
i i i i i i ets ets nets nets
i i
W P r dr c q q qμ σ α μ τμ= − − − −∑ ∑∫ . 
 
2.1 Emissions regulation in the presence of lobbying 
The problem of the incumbent government is to maximize its political support. To this aim it 
values the level of political contributions by interest groups besides social welfare (the latter 
presuming that a higher standard of living increases the chances for reelection). The regulator 
thus maximizes a weighted sum of contributions and welfare given an environmental 
constraint (i.e. the total emissions target) by choosing the allocation factor for ets sectors and 
the emissions tax for nets industries:1  
,
max ( , ) ( ) ( , )etsG K Wα τ α τ α θ α τ= +   s.t.  ets ets ets nets netsE q qα μ μ= + . 
In this framework, the government maximizes a social-welfare function that weights sectors 
represented by a lobby group with the weight 1+θ  and the remaining members of society 
with the (smaller) weight of θ . This formulation of the political-support function implies no 
restriction on the value of the parameter θ .2 Obviously, the higher the value of θ , the higher 
the regulator values social welfare in comparison to political contributions by interest groups 
(the regulator fully ignores lobby contributions in the extreme case of θ →∞ , whereas she 
only cares about political contributions for a θ  equal to zero). 
                                                 
1 As we consider a Pigouvian tax that aims to achieve the emission target E , we abstract from tax revenues here. 
2 Grossman and Helpman (1994) argue that one could alternatively formulate the government’s objective 
function as 1 2(( ) ) [ (( ) (( ) )]s s s s s s s s
s s
K W Kθ α θ α α+ −∑ ∑ , which for 2 1 2/ ( )θ θ θ θ= −  yields a 
maximization problem equivalent to the one presented above. 
 6
In the following, we analyze the regulatory behavior of the government in terms of allowance 
allocation and emissions taxation for two cases: the absence and the presence of interest 
groups. Denoting the Lagrange multiplier asλ  yields the following first-order conditions for 
the government: 
 
a) Absence of lobbying: 0)( =αetsK  and (for transparency) 1=θ  
Based on the firm’s first order conditions, implicit differentiation of the government’s 
objective function w.r.t. the allocation factor subject to the environmental constraint yields: 
'( )0 * ets ets ets
ets
cG W μ μα μα α λ σ
α
−∂ ∂= = ⇔ = − ∂∂ ∂ −
∂
.    (1) 
In the absence of lobbying the regulator maximizes social welfare. The optimal allocation 
factor thus depends on the marginal cost of emissions abatement in the ets sector, the shadow-
price of the environmental constraint, the allowance price as well as the emissions rate and its 
sensitivity to changes in the allocation factor. Analogously, the welfare-maximizing emissions 
tax can be derived based on the firm’s first order conditions: 
0 * '( ) netsnets nets
nets
G W c μτ μ λ μτ τ
τ
∂ ∂= = ⇔ = − − − ∂∂ ∂
∂
.    (2) 
 
b) Presence of lobbying: ( ) 0K α >  
In the presence of lobbying for emissions allowances by the ets sector, implicit differentiation 
of the regulator’s objective function w.r.t. α  yields the allocation factor that maximizes the 
political support for the government: 
( )
'( ) '( )0 ets ets ets ets
ets ets
ets
c KG
q
θ μ μ αα μ μα λ θσ λ θσα α
−∂= ⇔ = − +∂ ∂∂ − −∂ ∂
.   (3) 
Condition (3) shows that in the political equilibrium the allocation factor additionally depends 
on two policy-relevant factors: the government’s weight on welfare relative to political 
contributions θ  and marginal political contributions by the lobby group '( )etsK α . Likewise, 
implicit differentiation of the government’s objective function w.r.t. the emissions tax yields: 
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0 '( ) netsnets nets
nets
G c μλτ μ μτ θ
τ
∂= ⇔ = − − − ∂∂
∂
.    (4) 
The emissions tax in the political equilibrium thus differs from the welfare-maximizing 
emissions tax only by the government’s weight on social welfare relative to political 
contributions. In the following, we analyze the efficiency implications of the political 
equilibrium regarding the allocation of allowances in greater detail. 
 
2.2 Efficiency implications of lobbying for allowances 
In order to analyze how the political-support maximizing behavior of the government in the 
presence of lobbying affects the economic efficiency of emissions regulation, we compare the 
welfare-maximizing allocation factor, as given in (5), with the allocation factor that 
maximizes the political support for the government, as given in (7): 
*αα >  ⇔  (1 )'( ) '( ) etsets ets ets etsK c q μ θ λα μ α λ σ
∂ −> − ∂ − .   (5) 
We find that if and only if marginal political contributions exceed the threshold value on the 
right-hand side of condition (5), the political-support maximizing allocation factor results in a 
higher level than the welfare-maximizing allocation factor. This threshold value is the higher, 
the higher the marginal cost of emissions abatement, the output level, and the sensitivity of 
the emissions rate of the ets sector to changes in the allocation factor are. Condition (5) thus 
suggests that if the ets sector’s interest group is able to increase political contributions to a 
sufficiently large extent for a higher allocation factor (i.e. if the lobby group is sufficiently 
strong), the regulator implements an inefficiently high allowance allocation. More 
specifically, as the firm behavior in Appendix A.1 implies that marginal political 
contributions are ever positive, condition (5) states that for 1θ =  the regulator will always 
implement an inefficiently high allocation factor in the presence of lobbying. This is the case 
when it values social welfare and political contributions from interest groups equally high. 
The government’s environmental constraint immediately suggests that a higher allocation 
factor for the ets sector translates into higher emissions from this segment of the economy, 
which, ceteris paribus, increases the emissions reduction requirements for the nets sector in 
order to achieve the overall emissions target E . Conditions (13) and (14) in Appendix A.1 
imply that larger emissions reductions by the nets sector require the implementation of 
increased emissions taxation.  
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Proposition 1: If the government values social welfare and political contributions from 
interest groups equally high, the presence of lobbying induces an inefficient emissions 
regulation.  
 
2.3 The structure of allowance allocation 
In the following we assess the sub-sectoral distribution of allocated allowances within the 
emissions trading scheme. To this aim we describe the ets sector as being composed of s = 
1…S sub-sectors, each of which is represented by an industrial lobby group. Political 
contributions at the sub-sectoral level depend on a sub-sectoral allocation factor and are given 
by ( )s sK α . The political equilibrium within the ets sector can be derived analogously to 
condition (3) by profit maximization in the respective sub-sectors and the political-support 
maximizing behavior of the government on the aggregate sectoral level.  
We now analyze comparative statics in the resulting political equilibrium. Considering two 
exemplary sub-sectors 1 and 2, we can assess the determinants of allowance allocation within 
the emissions trading scheme:  
1 2α α>  ⇔  ( ) ( )
1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2
1 1 2 2
1 2
1 1 2 2
'( ) '( ) '( ) '( )c K c K
q q
θ μ μ α θ μ μ α
μ μ μ μλ θσ λ θσλ θσ λ θσα α α α
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥− −− + > − +⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥∂ ∂ ∂ ∂− −⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥− −⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥∂ ∂ ∂ ∂⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
.  (6) 
Given that / 0s sμ α∂ ∂ >  (see condition (12) in the Appendix), we arrive at the following 
conclusions. For a sufficiently small government weight on social welfare relative to political 
contributions (i.e. for /θ λ σ< ), the sub-sectoral allocation factor is (ceteris paribus) higher 
and thus regulatory stringency lower for industries of the emissions trading scheme featuring: 
(i) higher marginal cost of emissions abatement, (ii) lower emissions rates, (iii) higher 
marginal contributions of sub-sectoral interest groups and (iv) lower output levels. Result (iii) 
implies that sub-sectors represented by lobby groups which are able to increase political 
contributions to a larger extent for a higher sub-sectoral allocation factor (i.e. that are more 
powerful) face a lower regulatory burden. As the allocation factor represents the fraction of 
emissions freely allocated as allowances, our theoretical analysis predicts that firms belonging 
to industries that are represented by a more powerful lobby also receive a higher level of 
allowance allocation s s sqα μ  for a given level of emissions. We will test this central 
theoretical prediction by an empirical analysis in the next section. 
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Moreover, together with condition (5), condition (6) implies that if sub-sectoral lobbying 
power '( )s sK α  within the emissions trading scheme is strong enough to induce a sufficiently 
high allowance allocation for the aggregate ets sector (i.e. if *s s ets ets ets
s
q qα μ α μ>∑ ), sub-
sectoral lobbying does not only lead to allocation factor differences within the emissions 
trading scheme, but also to economic inefficiencies in the overall emissions regulation. 
 
Proposition 2: If the government values political contributions from interest groups 
sufficiently high relative to social welfare, those sub-sectors of the emissions trading scheme 
with higher lobbying power receive a higher level of allowance allocation. Sufficiently strong 
lobbying activities at the sub-sectoral level induce overall inefficiencies of emissions 
regulation. 
 
3 Empirical analysis for Germany 
In this section we present an empirical assessment of the determinants of EU ETS emissions 
allowance allocation at the German firm level in order to test our central theoretical prediction 
of the previous section. In its first trading phase, the EU ETS exclusively covers installations 
in energy-intensive sectors (such as electricity, iron and steel, or paper and pulp), while the 
remaining industries of EU economies (such as households or the transport sector) have to be 
regulated by complementary abatement policies in order to meet the countries’ overall 
emissions targets. The EU ETS prescribes the (mainly free) allocation of emissions 
allowances to installations according to historic levels by means of National Allocation Plans 
(NAPs) of the respective Member States, specifying an overall cap in emissions for the 
covered sectors. Our regression analysis particularly aims at investigating the role of interest 
groups for the allowance allocation design of the first trading phase of the EU Emissions 
Trading Scheme.  
 
3.1 Data and variables 
For the empirical analysis, we use a unique economic and environmental cross-sectional data 
set for Germany at the firm level. It is a data compilation based on three different sources: 
First, we employ the CREDITREFORM database, an economic database of German firms, 
from which we selected those firms regulated by the EU ETS (see Appendix A.2 for details of 
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the data base). In this respect, it should be noted that Germany is the most important country 
within the EU ETS in terms of carbon emissions, its companies representing roughly a quarter 
of all allowances allocated. Second, we make use of a data set on verified emissions and EU 
ETS allowances allocated in 2005 that is publicly available from the EU Community 
Independent Transaction Log (EU, 2007b). Given the fact that the Community Transaction 
Log contains information at the installation level only, emissions and allowance data were 
aggregated at the firm level. Third, for our political-economy analysis we integrated data on 
representatives of German industrial associations. This interest group data refers to the 
subsectoral level and was generated from a telephone survey conducted in 2004 (see further 
down). All in all, data including 175 German firms could be consistently compiled.  
The dependent variable of our regression analysis is the number of allowances allocated to 
regulated firms, as it represents the main governmental decision variable of emissions 
regulation in the EU ETS. As explanatory variables, we control for the verified emissions of 
installations in the year 2005 (both in levels and in squared terms) and the employment level 
(i.e. the number of employees) at the firm level. Our central explanatory variable is the 
number of sectoral lobby representatives, measuring potential political support provided by 
sectoral interest groups. In addition, we employ two interaction terms of the lobby variable. 
The corresponding descriptive statistics are shown in Table 2. 
Table 2 shows that our data set includes a broad firm interval of verified emissions and 
allowances allocated, e.g. allowances per firm ranging from 272 up to 346.000.000 tons of 
CO2-equivalent. Regarding the relationship between the number of allowances allocated and 
the verified emissions in 2005, the table suggests that the number of allocated allowances is 
relatively high compared to the level of 2005 emissions. In our German sample, the (firm) 
mean of allowances allocated is 533645.9 against 511996.5 (tons of CO2-equivalent) of 
verified emissions, which means that in 2005 allowance allocation to regulated firms 
exceeded actual emissions by about 30 per cent. This is in line with the findings of previous 
studies on EU ETS emissions allocation (see Kettner et al., 2007 or Anger and Oberndorfer, 
2008). In this context, it is important to note that verified EU ETS ex-ante emissions (e.g. 
from 2004 or earlier) were not published by the European Commission. Given this, verified 
emissions from 2005 are, on the one hand, the best available proxy variable for historical 
emissions as the main official allocation criterion. On the other hand, this lack of historical 
emissions data makes it impossible to exactly identify why verified emissions in 2005 
exceeded the respective number of allowances allocated. Although Ellerman and Buchner 
(2006) or Kettner et al. (2007) have considered abatement of emissions in the early EU ETS 
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phase as both less important and realistic – and have therefore interpreted the phenomenon of 
verified emissions exceeding allocated allowances mainly as a sign of “over-allocation” of 
firms with EU allowances3 – reverse causality with respect to verified emissions in a 
regression of allowances allocated on verified emissions cannot be excluded. Table 3 in 
Appendix A.3 underpins that these two variables are strongly interrelated.  
As a further potential determinant of allowance allocation within the EU ETS, the 
CREDITREFORM database reports the number of employees at the firm level. Here, we can 
especially make use of time series information from 2000 to 2004 on employment of the 
respective EU ETS firms. Given that EU ETS allowance allocation for the first trading phase 
was decided on in 2004 and the EU ETS came into force in 2005, 2004 employment levels 
could represent a determinant of allowance allocation, as worker lay-offs are traditionally a 
prominent argument of industries against environmental regulation (Kirchgässner and 
Schneider, 2003). However, also 2002 to 2000 employment levels are relevant for our 
analysis as they may serve as an instrument for possibly endogenous explanatory verified 
emissions variables (see above). In this context, we can also make use of firm revenues 
between 2000 and 2002 from the CREDITREFORM database.  
The central explanatory variable of our political-economy analysis is the number of lobby 
employees of the representative industrial association in each subsector. Subsectoral 
classification is based on the Input-Output Table (IOT) 1993 (see Table 5 in Appendix A.3 for 
a mapping between all IOT sectors and respective associations). This is the best available 
proxy for potential political support of sectoral interest groups for the government, as data on 
e.g. financial budgets of interest groups is not available for Germany. One example of 
political support provided by interest groups is information transfer from interest groups to 
policy makers (see e.g. Grossman and Helpman 2001). Accordingly, political support is the 
stronger, the more representatives a lobby group employs (e.g. by processing and providing a 
larger amount of relevant information to the policy maker. Our lobby variable contains the 
number of lobby representatives of industrial associations based on an extensive telephone 
survey conducted in 2004, the year of the decision on EU ETS allowance allocation for the 
first trading phase.4 For our sample, we can make use of lobby representative data of 14 EU 
                                                 
3 According to this interpretation, participating firms had received allowances for a higher amount of CO2 
emissions than they actually emitted, implying a very loose emissions cap of the EU ETS. 
4 The survey has been conducted at the Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW) in Mannheim, 
Germany, during June and July, 2004. Contact details of associations were taken from a database of German 
industrial organizations (Hoppenstedt, 2003). For 42 manufacturing subsectors of the German economy (only 14 
are relevant for our sample given the restriction of EU ETS to the four industry domains energy, production and 
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ETS subsectors. On average, each of these sectors employed 108 representatives. However, 
the number of such employees at the sectoral level is very heterogeneous, ranging from 7 to 
350. In order to differentiate between sectoral differences in allowance allocation that 
originate from lobbying activities and other sectoral factors (Buchner et al., 2006), we 
additionally generate three dummy variables (electricity, other energy, and manufacturing, 
with other sectors as reference category; see Appendix A.2) at the aggregate sectoral level in 
order to control for such industry effects. Controlling for industry effects at the less 
aggregated sub-sectoral level according to the Input-Output Table 1993 is not feasible as it 
would lead to perfect multicollinearity of sectoral dummy variables with the employed lobby 
variable. 
Given our set of explanatory variables, we can construct both nonlinear transformations and 
interaction terms in order to analyze how the impact of one explanatory factor depends on the 
magnitude of others: We make use of squared verified emissions in order to account for 
possible nonlinearities in the relationship between verified emissions and allocated 
allowances (e.g. if large emitters have been treated differently than small emitters). Interaction 
terms between the lobby variable and both verified emissions and the number of firm 
employees are included in order to test whether the lobby influence on the allowance 
allocation depends on economic characteristics of the respective firm. As instrumental 
variables for verified emissions-related variables, we introduce lagged employment at the firm 
level (in levels and squared terms) for the period 2000 to 2002. Those variables are measures 
of firm size which are assumed to be correlated with emissions-related variables, and (due to 
their historical character) are exogenous to the equation assessing the determinants of 
allowance allocation. 
 
3.2 Methodology 
For our cross-sectional analysis, we depart from the ordinary least squares estimator (OLS) 
for equation: 
iii xy εβ += '       (7)  
with yi  representing allowances allocated of firm i, xi being the vector of explanatory variables 
of the respective firm as presented in the previous section, and β giving the vector of 
                                                                                                                                                        
processing of ferrous metals, minerals and pulp and paper) we covered the representative industrial associations, 
with a focus on members of the Federation of German Industries (BDI). 
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coefficients to be estimated. εi is a disturbance term that is independent and identically 
distributed across firms Ni ,...,2,1= . Using OLS, the parameter vector is determined by: 
[ ] yXXX '' 1−=β       (8) 
where matrix X consists of rows xi’, and y is the dependent variable’s vector. While OLS 
serves as the starting point for our empirical analysis, it does not take into account the 
important issues of potential reverse causality, making robustness checks an all-important 
issue for our empirical analysis.  
Within the OLS approach, reverse causality problems may cause biased parameter estimation. 
As lined out in the preceding chapter, firm data on historical emissions is not available to 
date, which is why 2005 verified emissions (and possible variations of it) have to be used as 
explanatory variable(s) in the regression analysis. Given the nature of the EU ETS allocation 
process that is officially based on historical emissions, neglecting emissions data is not an 
option due to the problem of causing biased parameter estimates because of omitted variables. 
Still, firm emissions in 2005 could have been influenced by the number of allocated emissions 
allowances. Such effect would cause reverse causality problems rendering the regression with 
allowances allocated (as dependent variable) and verified emissions (as explanatory variable) 
biased and inconsistent. Instrumental variable technique is the usual remedy to such 
econometric problem. Within a Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS) approach, in the first stage 
the fitted values xi* from a regression of the (possibly) endogenous variables xi on the 
instruments zi are produced, while in the second those fitted values xi* replace the endogenous 
regressors xi in the regression of actual interest 
*'
ii i
y xγ ε= + .      (9)  
Given this, the 2SLS estimator for the parameter vector γ can be written as. 
[ ] 1* ' * * 'X X X yγ −=      (10) 
where matrix X* consists of rows xi* (first stage regression fitted values for endogenous 
explanatory, i.e. emissions variables, and exogenous explanatory variables, respectively). In 
the 2SLS approach, for instrumental variables to be valid two prerequisites have to hold: 
correlation between zi and the endogenous variable to be instrumented xi should be non-
negligible, while zi and the second-stage error term (εi from equation (9)) have to be 
uncorrelated. Firm employment (levels and squared terms) between 2000 and 2002 appear to 
be appropriate instruments for the verified-emissions variable and respective transformations: 
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they can be interpreted as indicators of firm size, a natural determinant of the amount of CO2 
emissions of energy-intensive companies. Moreover, being predetermined, there is no reason 
to expect correlation with the second stage regression error term. 
In the following, we empirically assess the determinants of EU ETS allowance allocation at 
the German firm level. In order to circumvent possible problems due to omitted variables, we 
make use of an extensive specification. In addition to verified emissions and the lobby 
variable, whose importance have been lined out in our theoretical framework, we additionally 
include squared verified emissions and the number of employees at the firm level, as well as 
interaction terms of the lobby variable with verified emissions and employees, respectively. In 
the 2SLS estimation, the verified emissions variable and its interaction terms and 
nonlinearities are instrumented in a first stage regression by lags (2000-2002) and the 
associated squared terms of the employment variable in addition to the explanatory variables 
of the 2SLS second stage equation.  
 
3.3 Estimation results 
Our quantitative estimation results, presented in, Table 1 suggest that the empirical set-up 
provides a very good fit to our data set, as shown by a very high R-squared for both 
econometric techniques used. Particularly verified emissions of the firms analyzed here have 
very strong explanatory power for the allowances allocated manifesting in a high statistical 
significance of the respective coefficients (at the 1%-level for each estimation technique). 
Accordingly, also the null hypothesis of joint insignificance of all explanatory variables can 
be rejected at the 1%-level for both techniques (F-Test). According to an F-Test, there is no 
indication for a misspecification of the 2SLS approach. First stage regressions of the verified 
emissions, squared verified emissions and the interaction terms between verified emissions 
and the lobby variables on the instruments (2000 to 2002 levels and squared terms of 
employment at the firm level) are well specified, as the null hypothesis of joint insignificance 
of all explanatory variables can be rejected at any conventional level (see Table 4 in Appendix 
A.3). 
Table 1 shows a positive sign of the estimated coefficient of the verified emissions variable, 
which corresponds to the nature of the EU ETS allocation process suggesting that emissions 
levels have a positive impact on the level of allowance allocation. For both estimation 
techniques, also the squared term of the emissions variable (included in order to control for 
nonlinearities in the relationship between emissions and the allocation process) enters highly 
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significantly into the estimated regression equation. Its negative sign suggests a concave 
relationship between verified emissions and allowances allocated.  
 
Table 1: Estimation results 
Dependent variable: 
Allowances allocated OLS 2SLS 
Verified Emissions 1.13***(0.00)
0.91***
(0.00)
Squared Verified Emissions -0.19***(0.01)
-0.32***
(0.00)
Employment 2004 -0.01(0.25)
-0.00
(0.79)
Lobby -0.01(0.16)
-0.00
(0.33)
Lobby x Verified Emissions 0.05(0.58)
0.40***
(0.00)
Lobby x Employment 2004 0.01(0.32)
0.00
(0.82)
No. Obs. 
R-sq. 
F-Test (P-Val.) 
175
0.99
0.00***
131
0.99
0.00***
Note: Standardized coefficients (regression coefficients obtained by standardizing all variables to have a mean 
of 0 and a standard deviation of 1) are reported. P-values in brackets (based on White robust std. errors). 
Estimations include sectoral dummy variables (estimated coefficients not reported). *, **, and *** indicate 
significance at the 10%-, 5%-, and 1%-level, respectively. 
 
In contrast, the estimated coefficient for the variable indicating the number of lobby 
employees does not significantly differ from zero at any conventional level, a result which at 
first sight does not confirm our theoretical prediction of Proposition 2 in the previous section. 
This holds for both estimation techniques applied. The estimated coefficient for the lobby 
variable does neither alter substantially when the instrumental variable technique to verified 
emissions-related variables is applied.  
However, we find an interesting result concerning the coefficient of the interaction term 
between the lobby and emissions variable: while standards OLS estimation does not yield 
significant parameter estimates, the coefficient of the interaction term is highly significant and 
positive under 2SLS. Note that the latter represents the adequate technique for our setting, as 
it eliminates estimation biases due to reverse causality of the emissions variable.5 This central 
                                                 
5 The magnitude of the (highly significant) estimated coefficient of the emissions variable for 2SLS is smaller 
than for OLS estimation, which may be a sign of actual reverse causality of the emissions variable, as one would 
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empirical result suggests that the combination of high emissions at the firm level and 
powerful lobbying activities in the respective sector induced higher levels of allocated 
allowances for German firms in the EU ETS.  
Given the insignificant coefficients of the lobby variable itself, the employment variable and 
the employment-lobbying interaction term, the 2SLS estimation results indicate that lobbying 
may influence the allocation process only in combination with specific economic 
characteristics of the respective industries: in our case, a high exposure to environmental 
regulation in terms of a high emissions level. In contrast, there is no indication that the level 
of firm employment matters for allowance allocation. Put differently, we find that in the EU 
ETS industrial arguments against environmental policy which were directly linked to 
regulatory exposure played a more critical role than more indirect policy issues.  
Both estimations include dummy variables indicating the sectoral affiliation at an aggregate 
level (electricity, energy, and manufacturing sector), in order to control for general sectoral 
effects within the allocation process. The central results for the analysis also hold when these 
sectoral indicator variables or, alternatively, insignificant explanatory variables are eliminated 
from the estimation. Moreover, the coefficient of the lobby variable remains insignificant if 
the interaction term between lobby power and verified emissions is dropped from the 
estimated equation (all estimations are available on request from the authors). 
In summary, the empirical analysis corroborates our theoretical Proposition 2 of the previous 
section which suggested a positive impact of sub-sectoral lobbying power on allowance 
allocation, but suggests that the lobbying effect is conditional on firm characteristics. The 
empirical analysis thereby provides important insight into the complex political-economy 
determinants of permit allocation in the EU ETS. Moreover, besides our empirical finding on 
the important role of lobbying for the allowance distribution within the EU ETS, in 
combination with Proposition 2 the estimation results suggest that considerable sub-sectoral 
lobbying activities were able to induce inefficiencies in the overall allocation design.   
 
4 Conclusions 
This paper assessed the political-economy aspects of allowance allocation in the EU 
Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) both on theoretical and empirical grounds. We 
                                                                                                                                                        
expect the effect of allowances allocated on verified emissions to be positive. For this case, i.e. that “over-
allocation” led to higher actual emissions and more stringent allowance allocation led to more abatement, OLS 
would over-estimate the impact of verified emissions on allowances allocated. Such a bias can be eliminated 
using the 2SLS technique. 
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developed a simple analytical framework of the role of interest groups for the allocation of 
emissions allowances in a cap and trade system. The model is structured as a common-agency 
problem, in which several principals (sectoral interest groups) aim to induce an action from a 
single agent (the government). In the stylized model, lobbying may influence political 
decisions, as the government does not only value social welfare but also political 
contributions by interest groups. In this setting, sectors represented by more powerful lobby 
groups thus face a lower regulatory burden in terms of less stringent allowance allocation. 
This does not only lead to distributional impacts within the emissions trading scheme, but for 
sufficiently high lobbying power can induce overall inefficiencies of emissions regulation: the 
political-support maximizing government implements an inefficiently high aggregate 
allowance allocation and shifts the abatement burden to those sectors excluded from 
emissions trading. As a consequence, these industries have to be regulated by a higher 
emissions tax in order to fulfill the national emissions target. 
An empirical analysis of the first trading phase of the EU ETS employing instrumental 
variable estimation technique affirms this theoretical prediction for a cross-section of German 
firms, but also shows that the political-economy determinants of allowance allocation depend 
on firm characteristics. While we do not find stand-alone lobbying effects on the overall 
number of allocated emissions allowances, we show that particularly large emitters 
represented by stronger German industrial interest groups were allocated significantly higher 
levels of allowances in the EU ETS. Our empirical analysis thus provides important insights 
into the complex political-economy determinants of permit allocation in the EU ETS: While a 
powerful interest group alone did not influence the allocation process significantly, lobbying 
paid off in combination with the political argument of exposure to emissions regulation. 
According to our analysis, those industrial arguments against environmental policy that were 
directly linked to emissions regulation played a more critical role than more indirect issues 
such as a political-economic importance in terms of employment levels. Together with the 
propositions from our theoretical model, these empirical results offer an explanation for the 
potential abatement burden shifting to sectors outside the EU ETS. Our results suggest that 
those EU ETS sectors represented by more powerful interest groups have not only benefited 
from a preferential allocation of emissions allowances compared to other ETS sectors – they 
were also able to lower the abatement burden of the EU ETS as a whole at the expense of 
overall economic efficiency.   
Suggesting that industrial lobbying has played a crucial role for emissions allocation at the 
German level, our results corroborate the existing critique on the allocation process of the EU 
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ETS. The findings of both our theoretical and empirical analysis thus provide arguments in 
favor of the use of auctioning instead of a grandfathered allowance allocation. The claim for 
an increased use of auctioning in emissions trading systems has, up to now, been mainly 
based on theoretical arguments concerning the reduction of tax distortions, the enhanced 
provision of innovations, and the elimination of potential lobbying influence (Cramton and 
Kerr, 2002). Despite the more stringent allowance allocation in the second trading phase of 
the EU ETS and the increasing application of auctioning, our empirical results thus provide 
new support for the auctioning debate in international emissions trading. To complement our 
primary insights into the determinants of EU emissions allowance allocation, empirical 
assessments for additional EU Member States as well as the second EU ETS trading phase 
constitute interesting directions for future research. 
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Appendix A 
A.1 Theoretical framework: Firm behavior  
Profit maximization in sector ets yields the following first-order conditions for firms in the ets 
sector: 
0 ( ) (1 )ets ets ets ets ets
ets
p c
q
π μ σ α μ∂= = − − −∂  ⇔  ( ) (1 )ets ets ets etsp c μ σ α μ= + −   (11) 
0 '( ) (1 )ets ets ets ets ets
ets
c q qπ μ σ αμ
∂= = − − −∂  ⇔  '( ) (1 )ets etsc μ σ α− = − .  (12) 
While condition (11) states that given the firm’s behavior the marginal benefit of sectoral 
production equals its social cost, condition (12) implies that the marginal cost of emissions 
abatement equals the permit price adjusted by the marginal cost or benefit from allowance 
allocation. Moreover, differentiation of the profit function w.r.t. α  implies that 
'( ) 0ets ets etsK qα σμ= > , i.e. political contributions increase in the allocation factor (as do 
sectoral profits). 
 
Profit maximization in sector nets yields the following first-order conditions: 
netsnetsnetsnets
nets
nets cp
q
τμμπ −−=∂
∂= )(0  ⇔  netsnetsnetsnets cp τμμ += )(   (13) 
netsnetsnetsnets
nets
nets qqc σμμ
π −−=∂
∂= )('0  ⇔  τμ =− )(' netsnetsc .   (14) 
Analogously to the first-order conditions in the ets sector, condition (13) states that the 
marginal benefit of nets production equals its social cost, while condition (14) implies that the 
marginal cost of emissions abatement equals the value of the emissions tax. 
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A.2 Empirical analysis: The CREDITREFORM database 
The CREDITREFORM database is a financial and economic database that includes 
information of sales and employment of German firms. It is the most comprehensive database 
on German firms, containing a random sample of 20,000 solvent and 1,000 insolvent firms in 
Germany. From the CREDITREFORM database, we use levels and differences from firm 
revenue and employment data between 2002 and 2005. Those data have been matched with 
the allocation factor (allowances allocated divided by verified emissions) from the EU 
Independent Community Transaction Log. This has been conducted by supplementing 
allocation data that has been aggregated at the firm level with CREDITREFORM data. The 
main criteria for this database matching were the respective company names and addresses. 
The matching results have been carefully checked for consistency reasons. Sectoral dummy 
variables have been constructed as follows: electricity: NACE code between 4000 and 4020; 
other energy: NACE code between 4020 and 4500; manufacturing: NACE code between 2600 
and 3700. 
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A.3 List of tables 
 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
 Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Allowances 
Allocated  175   533645.90 2808694 272 3.46e+07 
Verified 
Emissions (t CO2) 
175   511996.50 2907576.00 50 3.65e+07 
Squared V. 
Emissions  175   8.67e+12 1.01e+14 2500 1.33e+15 
Lobby (no. of 
representatives) 175   108.39 74.77 7 350 
Lobby x 
Emissions 175   6.48e+07 4.50e+08 8000 5.84e+09 
Lobby x 
Employment 2004 175   114553.80 282992 14 2370760 
Employment 2004  175   1279.56 3422.74 1 33810 
Employment 2002  175   1351.07   3875.96   1 33049 
Employment 2001  155   1088.37   3191.49   1 37707 
Employment 2000  144   1370.72   4645.31   1 42317 
Employment 2002 
squared 175   1.68e+07   1.16e+08   1 1.09e+09 
Employment 2001 
squared 155   1.13e+07   1.14e+08   1 1.42e+09 
Employment 2000 
squared 144   2.33e+07   1.82e+08   1 1.79e+09 
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Table 3: Correlation matrix of main regression variables  
 Allowances Allocated 
Verified 
Emissions 
Squared V. 
Emissions 
Employ-
ment Lobby 
Lobby x 
Emissions 
Lobby x 
Employ-
ment 
Allowance
s Allocated 1.0000       
Verified 
Emissions 0.9988 1.0000      
Squared V. 
Emissions 0.9792 0.9870 1.0000     
Employ-
ment 2004 0.0631 0.0648 0.0667 1.0000    
Lobby 0.0858 0.0799 0.0591 -0.0790 1.0000   
Lobby x 
Emissions 0.9985 0.9996 0.9872 0.0608 0.0892 1.0000  
Lobby x 
Employ-
ment 2004 
0.7180 0.1531 0.1519 0.8775 0.2450 0.1531 1.0000 
Note: 131 observations. Pearson’s correlation coefficient for the respective variable pairs is given. 
 
 
Table 4: Specification tests for first stage regressions 
Dependent variable Verified Emissions Squared V. Emissions Lobby x Emissions 
F-Test first stage regression 
specification (1) 
0.00*** - - 
F-Test first stage regression 
specification (2) 
0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 
Note: 131 observations. F-Test (p-value) on null hypothesis of joint insignificance of all explanatory variables.*, 
**, and *** indicate significance at the 10%-, 5%-, and 1%-level, respectively. The full results from 
these first stage regressions are available on request from the authors. 
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Table 5: German manufacturing sectors and respective industrial associations 
Sector No. Name of sector Industrial associations 
1 Agricultural products German Farmers Association (DBV) 
2 Forestry & fishery products German Forestry Council (DFWR) German Fishery Association (DFV) 
3 Electric power & steam & warm water German Electricity Association (VDEW) 
4 Gas Association of the German Gas and Water Industries (BGW) 
5 Water (distribution) Association of the German Gas and Water Industries (BGW) 
6 Coal & coal products 
German Mining Association (WVB) 
German Hard Coal Association (GVST) 
German Lignite Industry Association (DEBRIV) 
7 Minery products (without coal & gas & petroleum) German Mining Association (WVB) 
8 Crude oil & natural gas Association of the German Oil and Gas Producers (WEG) 
9 Chemical products & nuclear fuels Association of the German Chemical Industry (VCI) 
10 Oil products Association of the German Petroleum Industry (MWV) 
11 Plastics 
Association of the German Plastics Processing Industry (GKV) 
Federation of German Woodworking and Furniture Industries (HDH) 
Federation of German Paper, Cardboard and Plastics Processing Ind. (HPV) 
12 Rubber German Rubber Manufacturers’ Association (WDK) 
13 Stone & lime & cement German Building Materials Association (BBS) 
14 Ceramic German Federation of  Fine Ceramic Industry (AKI) 
15 Glass German Glass Industry Federation (BV Glas) 
16 Iron & steel German Steel Federation (WV Stahl) German Federation of Steel and Metal Processing (WSM) 
17 Non-ferrous metals Federation of the German Non-Ferrous Metals Industry (WVM) Federation of German Steel and Metal Processing (WSM) 
18 Casting products German Foundry Association (DGV) 
19 Rolling products Association of German Drawing Mills (STV) Association of German Cold Rolling Mills (FVK) 
20 Production of steel etc German Structural Steel and Power Engineering Association (SET) 
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Table 5 (continued): German manufacturing sectors and respective industrial associations  
Sector No. Name of sector Industrial associations 
21 Mechanical engineering Federation of the German Engineering Industry (VDMA) 
22 Office machines – 
23 Motor vehicles Association of the German Automotive Industry (VDA) 
24 Shipbuilding German Shipbuilding and Ocean Industries Association (VSM) 
25 Aerospace equipment German Aerospace Industries Association (BDLI) 
26 Electrical engineering German Electrical and Electronic Manufacturers’ Association (ZVEI) 
27 Engineers' small tools German Industrial Association for Optical, Medical and Mechatronical Technologies (SPECTARIS) Federation of German Jewellery, Watches, Clocks, Silverware and Related Industries 
28 Metal and steel goods – 
29 Music instruments & toys etc. 
National Association of German Musical Instruments Manufacturers (BDMH) 
German Association of the Toy Industry (DVSI) 
30 Timber Federation of German Woodworking and Furniture Industries (HDH) Association of the German Sawmill and Wood Industry (VDS) 
31 Furniture Federation of German Woodworking and Furniture Industries (HDH) 
32 Paper & pulp & board German Pulp and Paper Association (VDP) 
33 Paper & board products German Pulp and Paper Association (VDP) Federation of German Paper, Cardboard and Plastics Processing Industry (HPV) 
34 Printing and publishing German Printing Industry Federation (BVDM) 
35 Leathers & footwear German Leather Federation (VDL) Federation of the German Shoe Industry (HDS) 
36 Textiles Federation of German Textile and Fashion Industry 
37 Clothing Federation of the German Clothing Industry (BBI) 
38 Food products Federation of the German Food and Drink Industries (BVE) 
39 Beverages Federation of the German Food and Drink Industries (BVE) 
40 Tobacco products Federation of the German Cigarette Industry (VdC) 
41 Building & construction German Construction Industry Federation (HDB) 
42 Recovery & repair German Construction Industry Federation (HDB) 
 
